Arbeitspapier

FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany

This paper analyzes the impact of FORIS contracts on litigation and settlement decisions using a simple divergent-expectations model. A FORIS contract introduces contingent fee arrangements under the British legal cost allocation rule: the plaintiff pays a percentage of his settlement or trial returns to FORIS and obtains coverage for trial costs in case he loses in court; the plaintiff?s attorney receives the standard fee. We take into account the sequential nature of the settlement and trial decisions. Without FORIS contracts, only cases with positive expected value provide credible threats for the plaintiff and thereby motivate the defendant to agree to a settlement. A FORIS contract has two important effects: cases with negative expected value are turned into credible threats, hence a settlement is triggered. Even in positive expected value cases, the settlement result for the plaintiff is increased. According to our results, FORIS should prohibit settlement negotiations before a contract with the plaintiff has been made. The paper argues that FORIS should abolish the non-disclosure clause which prohibits the plaintiff to reveal the existence of the FORIS contract to a third party.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2001-04

Classification
Wirtschaft
Litigation Process
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Subject
Contingent fees
British cost allocation rule
Legal Cost Insurance
strategic moves
Gerichtliche Prozesskosten
Rechtsschutzversicherung
Erfolgsbeteiligung
Vertragstheorie
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
Deutschland
FORIS AG

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kirstein, Roland
Rickman, Neil
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
(where)
Saarbrücken
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Rickman, Neil
  • Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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