Konferenzbeitrag
No Crowding Out despite Kickbacks: Competition between Gatekeeping GPs
In health service markets, patients often rely on the advice of their general practitioner (GP) to decide which treatment best fits their needs. Hospitals, in turn, influence GPs referral decisions through kickbacks. We formulate a model with competitive heterogeneous GPs who differ in the degree to which they internalize the disutility that their patients suffer from inappropriate treatments. We prove that a separable equilibrium with referring and not referring GPs exist.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Health Economics II ; No. B11-V2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Felder, Stefan
Amann, Erwin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Felder, Stefan
- Amann, Erwin
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2017
Other Objects (12)
Imperfect competition, underemployment and crowding-out
Imperfect competition, underemployment and crowding-out
Crowding-out durch Staatsverschuldung?
Crowding In or Crowding Out? A Classical-Harrodian Perspective
Local crowding out in China
Crowding out : ein reales Phänomen?
Local crowding out in China
Rational Expectations and Crowding-Out
Fiskalpolitik, Staatsverschuldung und Crowding-out
Crowding out or crowding in? Public and private transfers in Germany
Crowding out or crowding in? Public and private transfers in Germany
Crowding-Out or Crowding-In? Heterogeneous Effects of Insurance on Solidarity
Imperfect competition, underemployment and crowding-out
Imperfect competition, underemployment and crowding-out
Crowding-out durch Staatsverschuldung?
Crowding In or Crowding Out? A Classical-Harrodian Perspective
Local crowding out in China
Crowding out : ein reales Phänomen?
Local crowding out in China
Rational Expectations and Crowding-Out
Fiskalpolitik, Staatsverschuldung und Crowding-out
Crowding out or crowding in? Public and private transfers in Germany
Crowding out or crowding in? Public and private transfers in Germany
Crowding-Out or Crowding-In? Heterogeneous Effects of Insurance on Solidarity
Imperfect competition, underemployment and crowding-out
Imperfect competition, underemployment and crowding-out
Crowding-out durch Staatsverschuldung?
Crowding In or Crowding Out? A Classical-Harrodian Perspective
Local crowding out in China
Crowding out : ein reales Phänomen?
Local crowding out in China
Rational Expectations and Crowding-Out
Fiskalpolitik, Staatsverschuldung und Crowding-out
Crowding out or crowding in? Public and private transfers in Germany
Crowding out or crowding in? Public and private transfers in Germany