Costly information acquisition and delegation to a "liberal" central banker

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Abstract: "Der Aufsatz befaßt sich mit einer Erweiterung der Arbeit von Rogoff (1985), in welcher ein Zentralbankier darüber entscheidet, wieviel Anstrengung er unternehmen möchte, um Informationen über einen Angebotsschock zu erhalten. Ausgehend von dieser Annahme ist es nicht notwendigerweise optimal für die Gesellschaft an einen 'konservativen' Zentralbankier zu delegieren. Dies erklärt unter Umständen, warum Delegation oft ein politisch kontroverses Thema ist." (Autorenreferat)

Alternative title: Kostenverursachende Informationsbeschaffung und Delegation an einen "liberalen" Zentralbankier

Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main

Extent: Online-Ressource, 10 S.

Language: Englisch

Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 99-18

Keyword: Geldpolitik
Notenbank
Informationsverhalten
Kosten
Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Theorie

Event: Veröffentlichung

(where): Berlin

(when): 1999

Creator: Lagerlöf, Johan

Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-194744

Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.

Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:23 AM CEST

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Associated

Lagerlöf, Johan
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Time of origin

1999

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Costly information acquisition and delegation to a "liberal" central banker

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Other Objects (12)

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