Artikel
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 761-793 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Market Design
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Subject
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Matching with constraints
medical residency matching
school choice
stability
strategy-proofness
matching with contracts
hierarchy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kamada, Yuichiro
Kojima, Fuhito
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2717
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kamada, Yuichiro
- Kojima, Fuhito
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2018