Artikel

Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 761-793 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Market Design
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Subject
Matching with constraints
medical residency matching
school choice
stability
strategy-proofness
matching with contracts
hierarchy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kamada, Yuichiro
Kojima, Fuhito
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2717
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kamada, Yuichiro
  • Kojima, Fuhito
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2018

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