Artikel

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative Games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 273-298 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
bargaining
supergame
confirmed proposals
confirmed agreements

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Attanasi, Giuseppe
García-Gallego, Aurora
Georgantzís, Nikolaos
Montesano, Aldo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3390/g6030273
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Attanasi, Giuseppe
  • García-Gallego, Aurora
  • Georgantzís, Nikolaos
  • Montesano, Aldo
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2015

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