Arbeitspapier
Individual responsibility and the funding of collective goods
When a deficit occurs in the funding of collective goods, it is usually covered by raising the amount of taxes or by rationing the supply of the goods. This article compares the efficiency of these institutions. We report the results of a 2x2 experiment based on a game in the first stage of which subjects can voluntarily contribute to the funding of a collective good that is being used to compensate the victims of a disaster. In the second stage of the game, in case of a deficit, we introduce either taxation or rationing. Each treatment is subjected to two conditions: the burden of the deficit is either uniform for all the subjects, or individualized according to the first-stage contribution. We show that the individualized treatments favor the provision of the collective good through voluntary cooperation whereas the uniform treatments encourage free-riding. Individualized taxation brings the voluntary contributions closer to the optimum while uniform rationing appears to be the worst system since free-riding restrains the provision of the good.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3041
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Collective goods
taxation
rationing
responsibility
interior optimum
experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Unternehmensfinanzierung
Rationierung
Steuer
Spieltheorie
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lévy-Garboua, Louis
Montmarquette, Claude
Villeval, Marie-Claire
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lévy-Garboua, Louis
- Montmarquette, Claude
- Villeval, Marie-Claire
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2007
Other Objects (12)
Individual responsibility and the funding of collective goods
Collective moral responsibility
Attribution of Collective Causal Responsibility to Individual Actors in a Stochastic System
Beyond Individual Criminal Responsibility?
Poverty and Individual Responsibility
Good governance of third party funding
Education funding and individual preferences for redistribution
Collective bargaining about corporate social responsibility
Individual and corporate social responsibility
Social welfare and individual responsibility
Individual responsibility for structural injustice
Individual and corporate social responsibility
Individual responsibility and the funding of collective goods
Collective moral responsibility
Attribution of Collective Causal Responsibility to Individual Actors in a Stochastic System
Beyond Individual Criminal Responsibility?
Poverty and Individual Responsibility
Good governance of third party funding
Education funding and individual preferences for redistribution
Collective bargaining about corporate social responsibility
Individual and corporate social responsibility
Social welfare and individual responsibility
Individual responsibility for structural injustice
Individual and corporate social responsibility
Individual responsibility and the funding of collective goods
Collective moral responsibility
Attribution of Collective Causal Responsibility to Individual Actors in a Stochastic System
Beyond Individual Criminal Responsibility?
Poverty and Individual Responsibility
Good governance of third party funding
Education funding and individual preferences for redistribution
Collective bargaining about corporate social responsibility
Individual and corporate social responsibility
Social welfare and individual responsibility
Individual responsibility for structural injustice