Arbeitspapier
Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade
Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2018/8
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Neoclassical Models of Trade
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Thema
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Maximum-Revenue Tariff
Free Trade
Perfect Competition
Cournot Oligopoly
Bertrand Oligopoly
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Collie, David R.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (wo)
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Cardiff
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Collie, David R.
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Entstanden
- 2018