Arbeitspapier

Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2018/8

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Neoclassical Models of Trade
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Thema
Maximum-Revenue Tariff
Free Trade
Perfect Competition
Cournot Oligopoly
Bertrand Oligopoly

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Collie, David R.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Collie, David R.
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2018

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