Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies

Arbeitspapier

Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that under divided government a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. An analysis of close elections providing quasi-random variation in the form of government and other robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. The empirical evidence is consistent with an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4564

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
• Subject: divided government ; legislative deadlock ; policy innovation ; US welfare reform ; policy competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bernecker, Andreas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89675
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET