Arbeitspapier

Designing institutions for diversity

This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research approach of the supplier, but the best approach is unknown. Diversity of approaches is beneficial because of the resulting option value. An auction induces the social optimum, while a fixed-prize tournament induces insufficient diversity. The optimal contest for the buyer is an augmented fixed-prize tournament, where suppliers can choose from a set of at most two prizes. This allows the buyer to implement any level of diversity at the lowest cost.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 200

Classification
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Organization of Production
Subject
contests
tournaments
auctions
diversity
procurement

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Letina, Igor
Schmutzler, Armin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-111830
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Letina, Igor
  • Schmutzler, Armin
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2015

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