Crowdfunding, Efficiency, and Inequality

Konferenzbeitrag

We show how decentralized individual investments can efficiently allocate capital to innovating firms via equity crowdfunding. We develop a model where consumers have privately known consumption preferences and may act as investors. Consumers identify worthwhile investments based on their own preferences and invest in firms whose product they like. An efficient capital allocation is achieved if all groups of consumers have enough wealth to invest.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Incomplete Information Games ; No. A09-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets ; Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grüner, Hans Peter ; Siemroth, Christoph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168081