Konferenzbeitrag
Inequality and Team Performance
We investigate the effects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute to a public good or a team output when agents are inequity averse. We show that inequality may increase total output when it favors the more able agents. Moreover, the more inequity averse the agents, the larger should be the inequality in wealth if total output is to be maximized.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams ; No. F12-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: General
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
- Thema
-
Public good
team incentives
inequity aversion
inequality
wage setting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kölle, Felix
Sliwka, Dirk
Zhou, Nannan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Kölle, Felix
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Zhou, Nannan
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010
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