Arbeitspapier

Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process

There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? The law is subject to uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and deters parties from settling disputes out of court. In contrast, the law is certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates in a model of tort litigation, study how they are affected by different policies, and compare the costs and benefits of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-071/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Litigation Process
Subject
incompleteness of law
complexity of law
litigation
judgemade law
legislation
Rechtsprechung
Risiko
Rechtsordnung
Rechtsökonomik

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe
Deffains, Bruno
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe
  • Deffains, Bruno
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2006

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