Arbeitspapier

The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s

Monetary policy rules have been considered as fundamental protection against inflation. However, empirical evidence for a correlation between rules and inflation is relatively weak. In this paper, we first discuss likely causes for this weak link and present the argument that monetary commitment is not credible in itself. It can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment based on panel data covering five decades and 22 OECD countries confirms the crucial role of a credibly backed monetary commitment for price stability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ROME Discussion Paper Series ; No. 12-07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Monetary Policy
Thema
Credibility
central bank independence
price stability
monetary commitment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Belke, Ansgar
Freytag, Andreas
Keil, Jonas
Schneider, Friedrich
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research On Money in the Economy (ROME)
(wo)
s.l.
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
01.03.2023, 13:58 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Belke, Ansgar
  • Freytag, Andreas
  • Keil, Jonas
  • Schneider, Friedrich
  • Research On Money in the Economy (ROME)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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