Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics

Artikel

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer, then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction. A simple example of a unanimity game with three players is provided where there are multiple globally accessible states for a small friction.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2008 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 155-192 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Thema: Equilibrium selection ; perfect foresight dynamics ; supermodular game ; strategic complementarity ; stochastic dominance ; potential ; monotone potential

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Oyama, Daisuke ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hofbauer, Josef
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New York, NY
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150109
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ