Arbeitspapier

University graduation dependent on family's wealth, ability and social status

This paper presents a model showing an incentive for a group of people to vote for higher tuition fees, even if these fees have no quality effect. The incentive is based on a non-monetary influence on utility, namely the social status or prestige of graduating. The basic assumption is that the higher the prestige is, the lower the number of people studying. In a static equilibrium, it is shown that a group of wealthier and more able people can exist that attempts to prevent others from studying.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 120

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
National Government Expenditures and Education
Thema
Studienfinanzierung
Studierende
Soziale Schicht
Bildungsökonomik
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ehlers, Tim
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
(wo)
Göttingen
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ehlers, Tim
  • University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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