Arbeitspapier

Whoever You Want Me to Be: Personality and Incentives

What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in most treatments but are correlated with intelligence when test-takers have information about desired personalities or are warned that responses may be verified. We document that actual job ads provide information about desired personalities and that employers in the UK who administer personality tests are also likely to administer intelligence tests despite the potential for substitution between the tests.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13809

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personnel Economics: General
Subject
personality
measurement
hiring
screening
experiments

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
McGee, Andrew
McGee, Peter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • McGee, Andrew
  • McGee, Peter
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2020

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