Arbeitspapier
Whoever You Want Me to Be: Personality and Incentives
What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in most treatments but are correlated with intelligence when test-takers have information about desired personalities or are warned that responses may be verified. We document that actual job ads provide information about desired personalities and that employers in the UK who administer personality tests are also likely to administer intelligence tests despite the potential for substitution between the tests.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13809
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personnel Economics: General
- Subject
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personality
measurement
hiring
screening
experiments
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
McGee, Andrew
McGee, Peter
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- McGee, Andrew
- McGee, Peter
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2020