Arbeitspapier

Benefit Reentitlement Conditions in Unemployment Insurance Schemes

Unemployment insurance schemes include conditions on past employment history as part of the eligibility conditions. This aspect is often neglected in the literature which primarily focuses on benefit levels and benefit duration. In a search-matching framework we show that benefit duration and employment requirements are substitute instruments in affecting job search incentives and thus gross unemployment. We analyse the optimal design of the unemployment insurance system (benefit levels, duration and employment requirements) under a utilitarian social welfare function. Simulations show that a higher insurance motive captured by more risk aversion implies higher benefit generosity and more lax employment requirements but also shortened benefit duration.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8991

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Subject
reentitlement effects
unemployment insurance
business cycle

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andersen, Torben M.
Kristoffersen, Mark Strom
Svarer, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Andersen, Torben M.
  • Kristoffersen, Mark Strom
  • Svarer, Michael
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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