Shut Down Option and Profit Sharing

Arbeitspapier

Aoki's profit sharing firm organization is associated with the option evaluation model of investment. The firm is endowed with a shut down option it can exercise when the market price, assumed uncertain, falls below a certain trigger level. The distributive parameter is the result of a bargaining process and it is influenced by the shut down option. Workers can delay the firm's shut down by sharing not only profits but also losses. In that case the workers' policy changes both the optimal distributive parameter and the trigger price in a non trivial way. The overall result implies an increase of the profit share going to shareholders as compared to the original Aoki's finding.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 190

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Moretto, Michele ; Rossini, Gianpaolo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 1994

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5136
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159033
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET