Arbeitspapier
Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2008,26
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Externalities
Public Goods
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
Stability of Coalitions
International Environmental Agreements
Partition Function Approach
Sharing Rules
Optimal Transfers
Renegotiations
Klimaschutz
Umweltabkommen
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Koalition
Internationaler Transfer
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Dellink, Rob B.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Dellink, Rob B.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2008
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
From Sticks to Carrots?
Stick, Carrot and Skill Acquisition
Trade Policy to Control Climate Change: Does the Stick Beat the Carrot?
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
Treatment versus regime effects of carrots and sticks
Treatment versus Regime Effects of Carrots and Sticks
Climate policies and induced technological change: Which to choose the carrot or the stick?
Carrots and sticks: Targeting the opposition in an autocratic regime
Sticks and Carrots for the Alleviation of Long Term Poverty
Ex ante carrots instead of ex post sticks: two examples
Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse
Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences
From Sticks to Carrots?
Stick, Carrot and Skill Acquisition
Trade Policy to Control Climate Change: Does the Stick Beat the Carrot?
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
Treatment versus regime effects of carrots and sticks
Treatment versus Regime Effects of Carrots and Sticks
Climate policies and induced technological change: Which to choose the carrot or the stick?
Carrots and sticks: Targeting the opposition in an autocratic regime
Sticks and Carrots for the Alleviation of Long Term Poverty
Ex ante carrots instead of ex post sticks: two examples
Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse
Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences
From Sticks to Carrots?
Stick, Carrot and Skill Acquisition
Trade Policy to Control Climate Change: Does the Stick Beat the Carrot?
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
Treatment versus regime effects of carrots and sticks
Treatment versus Regime Effects of Carrots and Sticks
Climate policies and induced technological change: Which to choose the carrot or the stick?
Carrots and sticks: Targeting the opposition in an autocratic regime
Sticks and Carrots for the Alleviation of Long Term Poverty
Ex ante carrots instead of ex post sticks: two examples
Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse