Arbeitspapier

Central bank haircut policy

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2010-23

Classification
Wirtschaft
Money and Interest Rates: General
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Subject
Payment
clearing and settlement systems
Central bank research
Monetary policy implementation
Financial system regulation and policies
Financial services
Zentralbank
Geldpolitik
Finanzpolitik
Öffentliche Schulden
Schuldenerlass
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chapman, James
Chiu, Jonathan
Molico, Miguel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2010-23
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chapman, James
  • Chiu, Jonathan
  • Molico, Miguel
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2010

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