Arbeitspapier

Making sense of non-binding retail-price recommendations

We model non-binding retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device facilitating coordination in vertical supply relations. Assuming both repeated vertical trade and asymmetric information about production costs, we show that RPRs may be part of a relational contract, communicating private information from manufacturer to retailer that is indispensable for maximizing joint surplus. We show that this contract is self-enforcing if the retailer's profit is independent of production costs and punishment strategies are chosen appropriately. We also extend our analysis to settings where consumer demand is variable or depends directly on the manufacturer's RPRs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3024

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
vertical relationships
relational contracts
asymmetric information
price recommendations
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Preisbindung
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Verhalten in Organisationen
Asymmetrische Information
Unvollkommener Markt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buehler, Stefan
Gärtner, Dennis L.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Buehler, Stefan
  • Gärtner, Dennis L.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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