Screening Disability Insurance Applications

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-018/3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Subject: disability insurance ; sickness absenteeism ; policy evaluation ; self-screening ; experiment ; Behindertenpolitik ; Behinderte Arbeitskräfte ; Versicherung ; Fehlzeit ; Kontrolle ; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse ; Niederlande

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): de Jong, Philip ; Lindeboom, Maarten ; van der Klaauw, Bas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86356