Hotel rankings of online travel agents, channel pricing and consumer protection

Arbeitspapier

We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions in their search results if these set lower hotel prices at other OTAs or on their own websites. We formally characterize how an OTA can use such a strategy to reduce price differentiation across distribution channels. Our empirical analysis shows that the position of a hotel in the search results of OTAs is better when the prices charged by the hotel on other channels are higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that OTAs alter their search results to discipline hotels for aggressive prices on competing channels, and by this reduce search quality for consumers.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-299-8
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 300

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
• Thema: consumer protection ; free-riding ; hotel booking ; online travel agents ; ranking ; search bias

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hunold, Matthias ; Kesler, Reinhold ; Laitenberger, Ulrich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/182000
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ