Arbeitspapier

Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context

In today's highly complex economic environment, cooperation among individuals is crucial for organizational and societal success. Most of the situations in which cooperation is required involve costly efforts whose consequences play out over time. Here, we provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of cooperation in an intertemporal context. In a first study, we show that cooperation is substantially reduced when the benefits of cooperation are shifted towards the future, and increased when the costs are delayed. An analysis of the underlying behavioral mechanisms reveals that the change in cooperation can be explained by (i) a shift in the beliefs about others' actions, (ii) a shift in the willingness to conditionally cooperate, and (iii) an individual's degree of impatience. We further demonstrate that social norms are unaffected by the timing of consequences, indicating that the shifts in conditional cooperation are due to a change in norm compliance rather than the norm itself. In a second study, we demonstrate that the amount of economic incentives needed to close the cooperation gap are substantial, thereby providing policy makers with a useful estimate for conducting cost-benefit analyses.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 046

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Cooperation
time preferences
incentives
social norms
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kölle, Felix
Lauer, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
(wo)
Bonn and Cologne
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kölle, Felix
  • Lauer, Thomas
  • University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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