Netting of capacity in interconnector auctions

Arbeitspapier

Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a netting auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer's incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2006,5

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Electric Utilities ; Auctions
• Subject: Divisible good auctions ; interconnector ; electricity marktes ; competition policy ; Stromnetz ; Kapazitätsauslastung ; Auktion ; Elektrizität ; Theorie ; EU-Staaten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Höffler, Felix ; Wittmann, Tobias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26889
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET