Arbeitspapier

On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods

The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2663

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Economics of Regulation
Subject
public goods
mechanism design
incomplete contracts
regulations
Öffentliches Gut
Finanzierung
Mechanism
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Allokationseffizienz
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bierbrauer, Felix
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bierbrauer, Felix
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2009

Other Objects (12)