Arbeitspapier

Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty

This paper sheds light on an empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination. We introduce individual demand uncertainty into Hotelling's model of product differentiation and show that firms offer advance purchase discounts. Consumers choose between an early (uninformed) purchase at a low price and a late (informed) purchase at a high price. Competing firms offer higher discounts in order to secure a large market share in advance. Our main result shows that whether competition has a positive or negative effect on price dispersion depends on the level of demand uncertainty and the degree of product differentiation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4490

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
competition
price discrimination
individual demand uncertainty
advance purchase discounts

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Möller, Marc
Watanabe, Makoto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Möller, Marc
  • Watanabe, Makoto
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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