Arbeitspapier

Transparency of regulation and cross-border bank mergers

There is ample anecdotal evidence that political influence constitutes a barrier to the integration of the EU banking market. Based on a dataset on the transparency on the supervisory review process of bank mergers in the EU, I estimate the probability that a bank is taken over as a function of bank and country characteristics and the transparency of merger control. The results indicate that banks are systematically more likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if the regulatory process is transparent. Particularly large banks seem to be less likely to be taken over by foreign banks if merger control lacks transparency.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 08-009 [rev.]

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Mergers and acquisitions
banks
barriers to consolidation
political interference
Fusionskontrolle
Internationale Bank
Übernahme
Fusion
EU-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Köhler, Matthias
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Köhler, Matthias
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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