Arbeitspapier
Information transparency, fairness and labor market efficiency
The paper studies the role of information transparency on fairness concerns, welfare and efficiency. When the firm's productivity and ultimately profits are revealed, wage offers induce relatively fair divisions of potential gains and workers respond with higher performance. Workers respond not only to wages but also to firms' intentions concerning fairness. Information transparency serves as a mechanism that promotes fairness and performance while the lack of transparency results in reduced earnings for workers and market inefficiency.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013-03
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Experiments
Incomplete Contracts
Fairness
Information Transparency
experimental economics
incomplete contracts
fairness
information transparency
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Isgin, Ebru
Sopher, Barry
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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New Brunswick, NJ
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Isgin, Ebru
- Sopher, Barry
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2013
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