Arbeitspapier

Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism

For reward-based crowdfunding, we introduce the strategy-proof Generalized Moulin-Shenker mechanism (GMS) and compare its performance to the prevailing All-Or-Nothing mechanism (AON). Theoretically, GMS outperforms AON in equilibrium profit and funding success. We test these predictions experimentally, distinguishing between a sealed-bid and a dynamic version of GMS. We find that the dynamic GMS outperforms the sealed-bid GMS. It performs better than AON when the producer aims at maximizing funding success. For crowdfunding in practice, this implies that the current standard of financing projects could be improved upon by implementing a crowdfunding mechanism that is similar to the dynamic GMS.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2022-084/I

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Woerner, Andrej
Onderstal, Sander
Schram, Arthur
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
2025-03-10T11:41:43+0100

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Woerner, Andrej
  • Onderstal, Sander
  • Schram, Arthur
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2022

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