Arbeitspapier

Auctioning monopoly franchises: Award criteria and service launch requirements

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - lowest price to consumers vs highest concession fee, and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 23.2009

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Auctions
Subject
Concessions
Auctions
Award criteria
Service Rollout Time limits

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Moretto, Michele
Dosi, Cesare
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Moretto, Michele
  • Dosi, Cesare
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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