Arbeitspapier
Auctioning monopoly franchises: Award criteria and service launch requirements
We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - lowest price to consumers vs highest concession fee, and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 23.2009
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Auctions
- Subject
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Concessions
Auctions
Award criteria
Service Rollout Time limits
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Moretto, Michele
Dosi, Cesare
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Moretto, Michele
- Dosi, Cesare
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2009