A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt

Arbeitspapier

This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt. Policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically-defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing. These revenues can be used to finance a national public good and district-specific transfers (interpreted as pork-barrel spending). The value of the public good is stochastic, reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters. In equilibrium, policy-making cycles between two distinct regimes: business-as-usual” in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork, and responsible-policy-making” in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good. In the long run, equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile, public good provision is too low, and debt levels are too high. In some environments, a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1441

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Dynamisches Modell ; Öffentliche Ausgaben ; Steuerpolitik ; Öffentliche Schulden ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Public Choice ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Battaglini, Marco ; Coate, Stephen
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31226
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET