Why do farmers seek office? Regulatory capture in Russian agricultural subsidization

Artikel

This study examines whether Russian farmers who enter regional politics can skew local policies in their favor. We hypothesize that Russian regions with more local members of parliament (MPs) owning agricultural businesses and farmer-ministers are more likely to allocate higher agricultural subsidies. To test these hypotheses, we use a unique 2008–2015 panel dataset on agricultural subsidies in combination with qualitative data. We find that the pervasiveness of agricultural interest in local parliaments affects the size of agricultural subsidies. Regional agriculture ministers who own farms may play the role of “gatekeepers” to the subsidies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Eastern European Economics ; ISSN: 1557-9298 ; Volume: 61 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 111-130 ; Abingdon: Taylor & Francis

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
• Subject: political connections ; redistribution ; agricultural subsdies ; businesspeople-politicians ; Russia

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kvartiuk, Vasyl ; Herzfeld, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Taylor & Francis
• (where): Abingdon
• (when): 2023

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1080/00128775.2022.2149556
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/268614
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET