Labour market screening with intermediaries

Arbeitspapier

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 138

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Auctions ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: Matching ; Multi-item auctions ; Sequential auctions ; Screening

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schweinzer, Paul
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2006

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13413
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94084
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13413-3
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET