Arbeitspapier

Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence

The paper investigates the role of the minimum wage in a competi- tive economy in which there is underreporting of earnings by employed labour. The minimum wage induces higher compliance by some low- productivity workers and transforms a nominally neutral .scal system into a regressive one. A spike in the wage distribution at the mini- mum wage level appears and a positive correlation between the size of the spike and the size of the informal economy is predicted and documented using cross-country data for Europe. A further result is that employees whose officially declared earnings appear to be boosted by a minimum wage hike actually experience a decline in their true income. This prediction finds support in an empirical test using the massive increase in the minimum wage that took place in Hungary in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment.

ISBN
978-963-9588-93-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2007/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Thema
Minimum Wage
Tax Evasion
Wage Distribution
Hungary
Mindestlohn
Steuervermeidung
Schattenwirtschaft
Lohnstruktur
Ungarn

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Tonin, Mirco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Tonin, Mirco
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)