Arbeitspapier

Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the rich are in majority. With a poor majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2011-13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
redistribution
self interest
inequality aversion
median voter
experiment
Einkommensumverteilung
Median Voter
Gerechtigkeit
Eigeninteresse
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Höchtl, Wolfgang
Sausgruber, Rupert
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
(wo)
Innsbruck
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Höchtl, Wolfgang
  • Sausgruber, Rupert
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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