Arbeitspapier

Economic development, democratic institutions, and repression in non-democratic regimes: Theory and evidence

This paper analyzes the utilization of repression and democratic institutions by a non-democratic government striving for political power and private rents. We find that economic development has different impacts on policy choices, depending on whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy and more repression. These theoretical findings are corroborated by panel data regressions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CEPIE Working Paper ; No. 04/17

Classification
Wirtschaft
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Human Rights Law; Gender Law
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Economic Development: General
Subject
Modernization Theory
Democracy
Repression
Non-democratic Government

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kemnitz, Alexander
Roessler, Martin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)
(where)
Dresden
(when)
2017

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-221345
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kemnitz, Alexander
  • Roessler, Martin
  • Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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