Arbeitspapier

Economic development, democratic institutions, and repression in non-democratic regimes: Theory and evidence

This paper analyzes the utilization of repression and democratic institutions by a non-democratic government striving for political power and private rents. We find that economic development has different impacts on policy choices, depending on whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy and more repression. These theoretical findings are corroborated by panel data regressions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CEPIE Working Paper ; No. 04/17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Human Rights Law; Gender Law
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Economic Development: General
Thema
Modernization Theory
Democracy
Repression
Non-democratic Government

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kemnitz, Alexander
Roessler, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)
(wo)
Dresden
(wann)
2017

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-221345
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kemnitz, Alexander
  • Roessler, Martin
  • Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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