Consistency and Communication in Committees

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan (2000) for the classical model, full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of the first best decision rule via truthful equilibria.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 02/2013

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Communication ; Committees ; Voting

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Deimen, Inga ; Ketelaar, Felix ; Le Quement, Mark T.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74640
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET