Arbeitspapier

Electing the Pope

Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualified majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-known public gure with publicly available personal data and well-known positions on public matters. This provides excellent grounds for a study of spatial voting: In this brief note we study voting in the Papal Conclave after the resignation of Benedict XVI. We describe the method of the election and based on a simple estimation of certain factors that seem to influence the electors' preferences we calculate the power of each cardinal in the conclave as the Shapley-Shubik index of the corresponding voting game over a convex geometry.

ISBN
978-615-5243-72-1
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2013/15

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Papal Conclave
game over convexge-ometry
Shapley-Shubik index
Geistliche
Katholizismus
Wahl
Wahlverhalten
Koalition
Spieltheorie
Shapley-Wert

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kóczy, László Á.
Sziklai, Balázs
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kóczy, László Á.
  • Sziklai, Balázs
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Entstanden

  • 2013

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