Arbeitspapier

Rotten parents and disciplined children: A politico-economic theory of public expenditure and debt

This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of debt, government finance and expenditure. Agents have preferences over a private and government-provided public good, financed through labour taxation. Subsequent generations of voters choose taxation, government expenditure and debt accumulation through repeated elections. Debt introduces a conflict of interest between young and old voters: the young want more fiscal discipline as they are concerned with the ability to of future governments to provide public goods. We characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dynamic voting game. If taxes do not distort labour supply, the economy progressively depletes its resources through debt accumulation, leaving future genereations enslaved. However, if tax distortions are sufficiently large, the economy converges to a stationary debt level which is bounded away from the endogenous debt limit. We extend the analysis to redistributive policies and political shocks. Consistent with the empirical evidence, our theory predicts governement debt to be mean reverting and debt growth to be larger under right-wing than under left-wing governments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2008,05

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Fiscal Policy
Public Goods
National Deficit; Surplus
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Subject
Fiscal discipline
fiscal policy
Government debt
intergenerational conflict
left- and right-wing governments
Markov equilibrium
political economy
public finance
repeated voting
Finanzpolitik
Öffentliche Schulden
Politische Entscheidung
Politische Partei
Wahlverhalten
Intergenerative Belastungsrechnung
Public Choice
Schätzung
OECD-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Song, Zheng
Storesletten, Kjetil
Zilibotti, Fabrizio
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Song, Zheng
  • Storesletten, Kjetil
  • Zilibotti, Fabrizio
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2008

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