Artikel

Leverage and Risk Taking under Moral Hazard

In this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of different capital regulations in mitigating the effects of moral hazard that exists only for systemically important banks. Leverage restrictions have the potential to reduce the fraction of banks that are systemically important but do not mitigate moral hazard for those that are. Risk adjusted requirements could mitigate moral hazard (of banks with low leverage) but do not affect (endogenous) systemic risk. A combination of both requirements as proposed by the Basel III framework can be successful, although only under restrictive conditions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Financial Services Research ; ISSN: 1573-0735 ; Volume: 61 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 167-185 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Capital regulation
Moral hazard
Leverage

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hott, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer US
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1007/s10693-021-00359-8
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Hott, Christian
  • Springer US

Entstanden

  • 2021

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