Arbeitspapier

Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made. Our most surprising result is that when there are no direct cost ofcommunication and communication can only help to identify the truth, more communication may reducethe probability that a correct decision is made. The reason for this result is that communicationmay aggravate the free-rider problem associated with collecting information.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-006/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Uncertainty
Deliberation
Learning
Collective decision making
Informationsverhalten
Informationsökonomik
Theorie
Politische Entscheidung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Swank, Otto H.
Wrasai, Phongthorn
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Swank, Otto H.
  • Wrasai, Phongthorn
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2002

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