Arbeitspapier

Bringing good and bad Whistle-blowers to the Lab

Whistle-blowing is seen as a powerful tool in containing corruption, although theoretical findings and experimental evidence cast doubt on its effectiveness. We expand a standard corruption model by allowing both, briber and official to initiate corruption actively, in order to assess the full effect of whistle-blowing. In our laboratory experiment we find that the effect of symmetrically punished whistle-blowing is ambiguous since it reduces the impact of corruption on productive activity, but also increases its stability. We show that asymmetric leniency for the official offsets the negative effect. The results can be explained by simple arguments about belief structures within the self-interested model of payoff maximizing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2011-4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Thema
Corruption
Experiments
Whistle-blowing
Punishment
Korruption
Soziale Gruppe
Whistleblowing
Extensives Spiel
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schikora, Jan Theodor
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.12161
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-12161-8
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schikora, Jan Theodor
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2011

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