Arbeitspapier

Ideological Motives and Group Decision-Making

This paper studies experimentally when and how ideological motives shape outcomes in group decision-making scenarios. Groups play a repeated coordination game in which they can agree on a payoff-dominant or a payoff-dominated but ideologically preferred outcome, or disagree and forego all payoffs. We find that groups which disagree initially are more likely to end up agreeing on the ideologically preferred outcome. We classify subjects into ideologically motivated and payoff motivated types and show that this effect stems from the two types’ differential reaction to disagreements. After disagreements, ideologically motivated types are more committed and steer the group towards their preferred outcome. Heterogeneous groups disagree more often and, thus, foster agreements on the ideologically motivated outcome. Our treatments show that, because of this mechanism, large groups are more likely to implement the ideologically preferred outcome than small groups. Furthermore, we show that individual ideological commitment is stronger when it targets the prevention of an outcome in conflict with the ideology than when it targets the implementation of an outcome aligned with the ideology. Theoretically, we study whether fixed or malleable ideological preferences can explain our results.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8742

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Thema
ideology
group decision-making
coordination
heterogeneous types

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Engl, Florian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Engl, Florian
  • Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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