Arbeitspapier
A Market Mechanism for Sustainable and Efficient Resource Use under Uncertainty
Sustainability and efficiency are potentially conflicting social objectives in natural resource management. We propose a market mechanism to allocate use rights over a stochastic resource to private managers. The mechanism endogenously determines the maximal tenure length guaranteeing that the sustainability goal is obeyed for sure over the entire period. In addition, the mechanism achieves efficiency, i.e. it maximizes the expected present value of resource rents that accrue to society. Potential applications include improved fishing agreements between developing countries and distant-water fishing fleets.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6524
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
-
auctioning-refunding-mechanism
efficient resource allocation
renewable resources
stochastic resource dynamics
sustainability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Quaas, Martin F.
Winkler, Ralph
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Quaas, Martin F.
- Winkler, Ralph
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2017
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