Konferenzbeitrag
Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis
In real world bargaining the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect real power. Game-theory predictions are insensitive to nominal differences. We refer to the converse idea that nominal differences matter as power illusion. We experimentally study the Baron-Ferejohn model with variation in nominal power. We find strong evidence for the existence of power illusion. Thus, attention needs to be paid to nominal power in the design of weighted voting systems.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games II ; No. B18-V3
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Maaser, Nicola
Traub, Stefan
Paetzel, Fabian
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Maaser, Nicola
- Traub, Stefan
- Paetzel, Fabian
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2017
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