Arbeitspapier
Income and policy choices: Evidence from parliamentary decisions and referenda
We analyze political representation of preferences of different income groups by matching referendum outcomes for low, middle, and high-income voters with individual legislators' decisions on identical policy proposals. Results indicate that legislators more closely represent preferences of rich voters than preferences of middle-income and poor voters, and legislators are more responsive towards the rich. Preferences of low, middle, and high-income voters are, however, correlated. Representation of income groups varies according to legislators' party affiliations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2014-19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
- Thema
-
Income
policy decisions
representation
voting
referenda
political behavior
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stadelmann, David
Portmann, Marco
Eichenberger, Reiner
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (wo)
-
Zürich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stadelmann, David
- Portmann, Marco
- Eichenberger, Reiner
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Entstanden
- 2014
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