Arbeitspapier

Legislature Integration and Bipartisanship: A Natural Experiment in Iceland

Nearly all legislatures segregate politicians by party. We use seating lotteries in the Icelandic Parliament to estimate the effects of seating integration on bipartisanship. When two politicians from different parties are randomly assigned to sit together, they are roughly 1 percentage point more likely to vote alike. Despite this effect, other-party neighbors do not affect general bipartisan voting, as measured by the likelihood that a politician deviates from their party leader’s vote. Furthermore, the pair-level similarity effect is temporary, disappearing the following year. The pattern of results support cue-taking and social pressure as mechanisms for the effects of proximity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9452

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
polarization
integration
intergroup contact
voting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lowe, Matthew
Jo, Donghee
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lowe, Matthew
  • Jo, Donghee
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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