Artikel

Why cash transfer programs can both stimulate and slow down job finding

This article analyzes the behavioral effects of cash transfer programs when jobless people need to have access to a minimum consumption level. Our model reconciles recent evidence about negligible or favorable effects of cash transfers on job-finding rates and the more standard view of negative effects. When unemployment compensation, if any, is low enough, we argue that cash transfer programs can raise the hiring probability. Our framework is flexible enough to generate the standard conclusion as well. Looking specifically at unemployment compensation, its optimal level is generally higher than when a lower bound on consumption is ignored.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: IZA Journal of Labor Economics ; ISSN: 2193-8997 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 5 ; Pages: 1-27 ; Warsaw: Sciendo

Classification
Wirtschaft
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Subject
poverty
unemployment
optimal insurance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Mesén Vargas, Juliana
Van der Linden, Bruno
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sciendo
(where)
Warsaw
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.2478/izajole-2019-0005
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Mesén Vargas, Juliana
  • Van der Linden, Bruno
  • Sciendo

Time of origin

  • 2019

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