Portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow

Arbeitspapier

We analyze novel portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow. Both the N-player game and the mean-field game are considered. We assume that players' trading activities have an impact on the dynamics of future market order arrivals thereby generating an additional transient price impact. Given the strategies of her competitors each player solves a mean-field control problem. We characterize open-loop Nash equilibria in both games in terms of a novel mean-field FBSDE system with unknown terminal condition. Under a weak interaction condition we prove that the FBSDE systems have unique solutions. Using a novel sufficient maximum principle that does not require convexity of the cost function we finally prove that the solution of the FBSDE systems do indeed provide open-loop Nash equilibria.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 327

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: stochastic games ; mean-field games ; portfolio liquidation ; Hawkes process ; singular terminal value

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fu, Guanxing ; Horst, Ulrich ; Xia, Xiaonyu
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (where): München und Berlin
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/256794
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET